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A CVSS Formula
1 Introduction
Computer security professionals are at several disadvantages compared to the adversaries
that seek to exploit computer systems. In particular, the ability to share information
between security professionals is more difficult due to the proprietary nature of many
software products and the associated risk in making vulnerability data available for wider
consumption. Attackers are seldom limited by these concerns.
With the stated goal of making information more readily accessible in service of tool
interoperability, risk sharing, and effective communication, the Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures list was made public in 1999 [3]. Over the last 21 years, the CVE list has
served as a common reference within the computer security community, and has expanded
to catalog over 180,000 unique exploits.
CVE entries are monitored by package managers such as nodejs’s npm [24] for automatic
alerts and patching and are incorporated into security testing suites including Metas-
ploit [22]. Having a common framework for identifying attacks has advanced the original
mission behind the publication of the CVE list—making rapid communication about the
development of security threats both possible and practical.
In addition, there is now a public trove of security data that covers numerous publicly
known attacks over a period of 20 years. This dataset confers the added benefit of allowing
researchers to discover patterns in the development of security threats. By understanding
how the attack landscape is changing, vendors can harden their products against the most
relevant threat types, vectors, and designs.
The goal of this thesis is to leverage techniques in unsupervised learning and data mining
in order to identify and visualize patterns in the development of threats over the lifespan of
the CVE list. First, we will explore how data is formatted in the CVE list and associated
sources and cover any necessary preprocessing.
Then we will compare two clustering techniques: K-Medoids and Hierarchical Clustering
to examine the relationship between categorical features in the CVE data. In particular,
we focus on whether products can be organized according to shared exploit characteristics.
We also use kernelized principal component analysis to represent data in two dimensions.
In the following chapter, we consider segmentation and change point detection, variants on
2a one-dimensional clustering problem. We outline an approach for finding optimal K seg-
mentations using dynamic programming, an approach for finding monotonic segmentations
in exponentially distributed data, and a change point detection method for multinomially
distributed data. These methods are used to analyze severity, delay between exploits, and
categorical data (exploit types, attack patterns, severity factors) respectively.
Together, these experiments help to identify how the CVE list has changed over the course
of its history. These changes illustrate both static and dynamic aspects of the current
security landscape.
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce and summarize the CVE
data. In Chapter 3, we cover clustering to examine the relationship between categorical
features using K-medoids and hierarchical clustering. In Chapter 4, we consider three seg-
mentation methods: a dynamic programming solution, a monotonic segmentation solution,
and Multinomial Change Detection Method, an online change point detection algorithm
for categorical data. We identify related work in Chapter 5 and conclude with a discussion
in Chapter 6.
2 CVE data
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is a list of computer security threats pro-
vided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and maintained by the MITRE
corporation.
Per MITRE’s terminology, CVE distinguishes between vulnerabilities where
A ”vulnerability” is a weakness in the computational logic (e.g., code) found in
software and some hardware components (e.g., firmware) that, when exploited,
results in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, OR availability. Miti-
gation of the vulnerabilities in this context typically involves coding changes,
but could also include specification changes or even specification deprecations
(e.g., removal of affected protocols or functionality in their entirety).
and exposures where
An ”exposure” is a system configuration issue or a mistake in software that
allows access to information or capabilities that can be used by a hacker as a
stepping-stone into a system or network.
CVE considers a configuration issue or a mistake an exposure if it does not
directly allow compromise but could be an important component of a successful
attack, and is a violation of a reasonable security policy.
though both vulnerabilities and exposures are present in the CVE list [20].
CVE data entries are distributed as part of the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
where they are augmented to reflect the severity of their impact and any available fixes.
For the purposes of this paper, CVE data will be used to refer to both the CVE entry
itself and any associated data from the NVD or other authoritative sources.
CVE data was obtained from the hosted JSON files at The Computer Incident Response
Center Luxembourg (CIRCL) through their cve-search project (http://cve-search.org/
dataset/). This data is updated daily and the figures in this thesis represent the data
dump from April 13, 2020.
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"id":"CVE-2010-3333"
"Modified": "2018-10-12T21:58:00",
"Published": "2010-11-10T03:00:00",
"access": {
"authentication": "NONE",
"complexity": "MEDIUM",
"vector": "NETWORK"
},
"cvss": 9.3,
"cvss-time": "2018-10-12T21:58:00",
"cvss-vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C",
"cwe": "CWE-119",
"id": "CVE-2010-3333",
"impact": {
"availability": "COMPLETE",
"confidentiality": "COMPLETE",
"integrity": "COMPLETE"
},
"summary": "Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office XP SP3,
Office 2003 SP3, Office 2007 SP2, Office 2010, Office 2004 and 2008
for Mac, Office for Mac 2011, and Open XML File Format Converter for
Mac allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted RTF
data, aka \"RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability.\"",
}
Figure 2.1: A sample JSON entry for CVE-2010-3333
2.1 Features
Next we are going to describe the features selected for this thesis (outlined in Table 2.1).
We group features in four categories: edit time log, exploit class, text, and severity factors.
2.1.1 CVE IDs
Though not a feature proper, entries are indexed by their CVE ID. The CVE ID is a
unique identifier assigned to a particular vulnerability or exposure by a CVE Numbering
Authority (CNA). These organizations represent governments, industry response teams,
and affected vendors. At the time of writing, there are 116 such CNAs representing 22
5Table 2.1: Selected CVE features split into four groups
Group Attribute Type Description
Edit time log
publication date datetime time the entry was published
modification date datetime time the entry was last modified
Exploit class
CWE name text Common Weakness Enumeration classification
CWE code int unique id for the associated CWE classification
Text summary text a short description of the exploit
Severity factors
CVSS float a severity score (0–10)
access authentication categorical {NONE, SINGLE, MULTIPLE}
access complexity categorical {LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH}
access vector categorical {LOCAL, NETWORK, ADJ. NETWORK}
availability impact categorical {NONE, PARTIAL, COMPLETE}
confidentiality impact categorical {NONE, PARTIAL, COMPLETE}
integrity impact categorical {NONE, PARTIAL, COMPLETE}
countries.
CVE IDs are currently issued with the following format: the CVE prefix followed by the
year and the sequence number. Sequence numbers are at least 4 digits long, but can be
an arbitrary length. The only sequence numbers prefixed with leading zeroes are 1–999.
Sequence numbers can be reserved for later use, but are otherwise issued in order [21].
For example CVE-2010-3333 was issued before the format change (in 2010) and has been
assigned sequence number 3333.
2.1.2 Edit time log
The number of known threats has continued to grow since the system’s release in Septem-
ber 1999. Understanding how the nature and scope of threats has changed over time
requires an ordinal feature. For the purposes of this thesis, CVE entries are ordered by
publication date. Entries may be modified after their publication, and for this purpose a
modification date is also published along with the associated changelog. The experiments
in this paper, however, do not explicitly account for modification.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the distribution of threats and how its growth has changed over time.
The proliferation of new threats has leveled over the course of the last decade. Due to
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Figure 2.2: Threat Proliferation: The number of known threats (left) continues to grow, but growth
(right), measured as a percent change on a 12-month rolling average, has leveled.
sparsity of data before 1999, all entries made before the list’s public release have been
dropped from consideration for the experiments in this thesis.
2.1.3 Exploit class
Each CVE entry is associated with a weakness classification according to the Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) which is also published and maintained by the MITRE
Corporation. The goal of this list is to categorize how threats affect products to help
identify and fix related exploits. The CWE name is most often a succinct description
of how the exposure or vulnerability affects the system. For example, CVE-2010-3333 is
associated with CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a
Memory Buffer.
CWE names can also reference hierarchical or archetypal descriptions of threats. Several
extant taxonomies (e.g. Seven Pernicious Kingdoms) of CWEs have their own CWE
entries to represent these hierarchies. A CVE threat can also be assigned a higher-order
CWE classification if the lower-order classifications fail to describe its behavior.
There are three placeholders used to indicate a null CWE in the data. These are Unknown,
NVD-CWE-Other, and NVD-CWE-noinfo. Since CWE codes are used in most of the experi-
ments in Chapters 2 and 3, null valued CWE codes are dropped from consideration.
Figure 2.3 shows the trends among the top-ten (by frequency in the entire CVE list at the
time of writing) CWEs. The trends shown indicate that the relative prominence of CWE
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Figure 2.3: CWE Trends: These threats are the 10 most common, but their relative prominence is
shifting, SQL injection is becoming less common while cross-site scripting and improper input validation
are on the rise. Values are shown as a 365-entry rolling average of relative frequencies.
codes is dynamic over time, with different attacks falling in and out of fashion.
2.1.4 Description
Each CVE entry is given a text description. This description, 40 words on average, is
provided by the CNA at the time of assignment. It may contain a list of affected products, a
short description of the attack, affected files, and a overview of the attack’s impact though
the content varies significantly.
There are three marks that can be added to a CVE description. The first, RESERVED,
indicates that a CNA is reserving a CVE ID for later use. Usually this label is only
held while the details of an entry are being populated. The second, REJECT, indicates a
CVE that has been removed from the CVE list, usually for administrative reasons (e.g. a
duplicate entry or an inaccurate entry removed by the issuing CNA). The third, DISPUTED,
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Figure 2.4: Threat Severity Distribution: CVSS scores reflect a threat’s severity. Over 50 percent
of scores (left) fall in FIRST’s Medium threat category with a thicker tail toward the higher end of
the spectrum. The average severity (right), shown as a 12-month rolling average, has remained largely
constant.
indicates that parties disagree as to whether or not an entry is a vulnerability. For the
experiments in this paper, RESERVED and REJECT entries are dropped from the dataset,
but DISPUTED entries remain.
2.1.5 Severity
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an open framework for describing
the characteristics and severity of computer security exploits developed and maintained
by the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). Scores range from 0–10
and can also be assessed using a qualitative, categorical scale: None (0.0), Low (0.1–3.9),
Medium (4.0–6.9), High (7.0–8.9), Critical (9.0–10.0). Though this scale was introduced in
the version 3 specification, it applies retroactively [7]. The distribution of these qualitative
labels and the trend of the quantitative score are shown in Figure 2.4.
Scores are calculated by combining several categorical metrics. Each metric is assigned
according to a scoring rubric. The complete list of factors (for CVSS version 2) can
be seen in Figure 2.6, however, we only consider the CVSSv2 base score and the six base
(non-optional) metrics: Access Vector, Access Complexity, Authentication, Confidentiality
Impact, Integrity Impact, and Availability Impact. Trends in these metrics are presented
in Figure 2.5 as annualized averages.
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Figure 2.5: Base metric trends: all three impacts and the access vector are volatile and don’t show a
clear long term trend; the access and complexity required, however, is steadily increasing.
No data present has a null CVSS score, though data may be missing any of the six base
metrics. Rows with null values are retained except for calculations and transformations
that explicitly require non-null metrics.
We provide the formulas for computing CVSSv2 scores in Appendix A. For example, CVE-
2010-3333 was rated Severe (with a score of 9.3) since it allowed arbitrary code execution.
More specifically, it completely compromised all three of the impact metrics while requiring
only moderately complex network access with no required authentication.
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Figure 2.6: Components of CVSS (from FIRST [6] Figure 1)
2.1.6 Exploitability metrics
Exploitability metrics (access vector, access complexity, and authentication) characterize
how attacks affect their targets. They comprise 40% of the final CVSS Base Score.
Access Vector
Table 2.2: The rubric for Access Vector (from FIRST [6] Table 1)
Name Initial Description
Local L A vulnerability exploitable with only local access requires the attacker
to have either physical access to the vulnerable system or a local (shell)
account. Examples of locally exploitable vulnerabilities are peripheral
attacks such as Firewire/USB DMA attacks, and local privilege escalations
(e.g., sudo).
Adjacent Network A A vulnerability exploitable with adjacent network access requires the at-
tacker to have access to either the broadcast or collision domain of the
vulnerable software. Examples of local networks include local IP subnet,
Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, and local Ethernet segment.
Network N A vulnerability exploitable with network access means the vulnerable soft-
ware is bound to the network stack and the attacker does not require local
network access or local access. Such a vulnerability is often termed ”re-
motely exploitable”. An example of a network attack is an RPC buffer
overflow.
An access vector is the avenue by which an attacker exploits a system. There are three
access vectors in CVSSv2: Local (L), Adjacent Network (A), and Network (N). The rubric
for assigning an attack vector is shown in Table 2.2.
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Access Complexity
Table 2.3: The rubric for Access Complexity (from FIRST [6] Table 2 with some examples omitted)
Label Initial Description
High H Specialized access conditions exist. For example:
– In most configurations, the attacking party must already have elevated privi-
leges or spoof additional systems in addition to the attacking system.
– The attack depends on social engineering methods that would be easily de-
tected by knowledgeable people.
– The vulnerable configuration is seen very rarely in practice.
Medium M The access conditions are somewhat specialized; the following are examples:
– The attacking party is limited to a group of systems or users at some level of
authorization, possibly untrusted.
– The affected configuration is non-default, and is not commonly configured.
– The attack requires a small amount of social engineering that might occasion-
ally fool cautious users.
Low L Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. The follow-
ing are examples:
– The affected product typically requires access to a wide range of systems and
users, possibly anonymous and untrusted.
– The affected configuration is default or ubiquitous.
Access complexity is a summary of how complex an attack must be to exploit a system.
There are three levels of access complexity in CVSSv2: High (H), Medium (M), and Low
(L). The rubric for assigning an access complexity is shown in Table 2.3
Authentication
Authentication records how many times an attacker must obtain authentication for the
exploit to succeed. Possible values are Multiple (M), Single (S), and None (N). The rubric
is shown in Table 2.4
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Table 2.4: The rubric for Authentication (from FIRST [6] Table 3 with an example omitted)
Label Initial Description
Multiple M Exploiting the vulnerability requires that the attacker authenticate two or more
times, even if the same credentials are used each time.
Single S The vulnerability requires an attacker to be logged into the system (such as at a
command line or via a desktop session or web interface).
None N Authentication is not required to exploit the vulnerability.
2.1.7 Impact metrics
Impact metrics measure the resultant impact of an attack on any affected targets. Impacts
are all scored with the same values: None (N), Partial (P), and Complete (C). Impact
assessments comprise 60% of the final base score.
Confidentiality Impact
Table 2.5: The rubric for Confidentiality Impact (from FIRST [6] Table 4)
Label Initial Description
None N There is no impact to the confidentiality of the system.
Partial P There is considerable informational disclosure. Access to some system files is possible,
but the attacker does not have control over what is obtained, or the scope of the loss
is constrained. An example is a vulnerability that divulges only certain tables in a
database.
Complete C There is total information disclosure, resulting in all system files being revealed. The
attacker is able to read all of the system’s data (memory, files, etc.)
Confidentiality is the protection of information from unauthorized disclosure. Confiden-
tiality impact measures the degree to which an attack resulted in information disclosure.
The rubric for scoring confidentiality impact is shown in Table 2.5.
Integrity Impact
Integrity is a measure of a system’s ability to protect itself. If integrity is compromised,
the affected product can no longer make guarantees about how it performs or is configured.
The rubric for scoring integrity impact is shown in Table 2.6.
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Table 2.6: The rubric for Integrity Impact (from FIRST [6] Table 5)
Label Initial Description
None N There is no impact to the integrity of the system.
Partial P Modification of some system files or information is possible, but the attacker does
not have control over what can be modified, or the scope of what the attacker can
affect is limited. For example, system or application files may be overwritten or
modified, but either the attacker has no control over which files are affected or the
attacker can modify files within only a limited context or scope.
Complete C There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system
protection, resulting in the entire system being compromised. The attacker is able
to modify any files on the target system.
Availability Impact
Availability measures whether resources can be accessed by clients. As a system’s avail-
ability suffers, clients can no longer access affected resources. The rubric for scoring
availability impact is shown in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: The rubric for Availability Impact (from FIRST [6] Table 6)
Label Initial Description
None N There is no impact to the availability of the system.
Partial P There is reduced performance or interruptions in resource availability. An exam-
ple is a network-based flood attack that permits a limited number of successful
connections to an Internet service.
Complete C There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can render the
resource completely unavailable.
2.2 Associated data
In addition to the above data, each CVE entry can be associated with multiple attack
patterns and affected products.
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2.2.1 Attack patterns
Released in 2007, the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
list is another part of the Mitre corporation and their partners’ efforts to chronicle com-
puter security threats. An attack pattern, inspired by the concept of design patterns from
software engineering, is a description of methods used by attackers across multiple security
exploits.
Common examples of attack patterns include, XSS in HTTP query strings and rainbow
table password cracking. Unlike the CWE, which focuses on the effects of security threats,
CAPEC describes common ways that exploits are designed with the intent of sharing ways
to mitigate these same patterns.
2.2.2 Affected products
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Figure 2.7: Top affected products: the number of unique CVE entries per product is shown for the top
25 affected products, most of which are operating systems (blue) or web browsers (green)
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Figure 2.8: Top affected vendors: the number of unique CVE entries per vendor is shown for the top 25
affected vendors.
The products affected by a given CVE entry are listed according to the Common Platform
Enumeration (CPE) which is maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) at the time of writing. The CPE was formerly maintained by the Mitre
Corporation.
The CVE data provided by CIRCL lists products in CPE 2.3 formatted string bindings.
These bindings are part of the naming layer of CPE [23]. Though all of the names present
are software names, CPE also extends to hardware naming. Each formatted string is a
colon separated string,
cpe:2.3: part : vendor : product : version : update : edition :
language : sw_edition : target_sw : target_hw : other
Not all fields need to be specified and a wildcard * can be used. For the purposes of
this paper, only vendor, product, and version information will be retained. The top 25
products by unique CVE count are shown in Figure 2.7; the top 25 vendors are shown
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in Figure 2.8. CVE associated data is many-to-many in nature, a single CVE can affect
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Figure 2.9: Shared CVEs: products with more than 500 unqiue CVEs are represented as graph nodes
(scaled to reflect the number of CVEs that affect a given product). Edges represent the number of CVE
entries a pair of products have in common.
multiple products and a single product may be affected by multiple CVE entries. As
we consider clusterings across products, note that some of the aggregations will include
the same CVE entry multiple times for different products. Figure 2.9 represents which
products have CVEs in common as a weighted graph.
3 Clustering
Clustering is a family of unsupervised methods where data are divided into self-similar
groups called clusters. In this section, we will examine two clustering methods: K-medoids
and hierarchical clustering.
We will apply clustering to analyze the relationship between different categorical features in
order to better understand how they influence one another. In particular, we will examine
how products relate to exploit types and how products relate to attack patterns. These
relationships will be examined in both directions, for example, clustering both products
by exploit type and exploit types by product.
First, in Sections 3.1–3.2, we will discuss how we represent categorical data and project
them into 2-dimensional space. Then, we will discuss clustering according to K-medoids
in Section 3.3 and hierarchical clustering in Section 3.4. At the end of the chapter, in
Section 3.5, we will compare these two clustering methods.
3.1 Representing categorical data
Categorical data are data that are divided into groups called categories. A categorical
feature Fi is a sequence of labels Fi = x(1)i , . . . , x
(N)
i . The label set Li = {x(j)i ∈ Fi} is the
set of unique labels that occur in the sequence.
To examine the relationship between two categorical features FA and FB indexed by a
common index set I = {1, . . . , N}, we use the normalized co-occurrence matrix, Y BA . Y BA ,
is a |LA| × |LB| matrix whose entries
Y ba =
|{i ∈ I;x(i)A = a, x(i)B = b}|
|{i ∈ I;x(i)A = a}|
represent the relative frequencies of each label in LB for each label in LA. Note that
each row sums to 1. For example, Y CWEproduct considers the relative frequency of CWE codes
aggregated according to products.
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Table 3.1: Kernels considered in this paper and included in sklearn’s implementation of Kernel PCA.
Additional parameters: γ is a scale parameter, c0 is a constant additive or intercept, d is the dimensionality
of x.
Kernel name K(x, x′)
Linear x · x′
Polynomial (γx · x′ + c0)d
Radial Basis Function exp(−γ||x− x′||2)
Cosine x · x
′
||x||||x′||
3.2 Kernel PCA
Principal component analysis (PCA) is used in this thesis as a dimensionality reduction
technique to project clusterings into 2-dimensional space. PCA finds a projection in such
a way as to maximize the variance retained from the original data. To perform the trans-
formation, data are first zero-centered, and then an eigen-decomposition of the covari-
ance matrix yields eigenvectors and eigenvalues. The eigenvectors that correspond to the
highest valued eigenvalues are the principal components [32]. To achieve dimensionality
reduction, data points are projected onto these principal components.
In this thesis, we consider a kernalized version of PCA. Kernel methods allow us to rep-
resent data in an alternate space, Z. Let φ : X → Z be a function that maps input from
the original space, X to an alternate space, Z. The goal of Kernel PCA is to map the
data according to φ and then perform PCA. To accomplish this, we introduce a kernel
function. Let the kernel function K(x, x′) be equivalent to the inner product φ(x) · φ(x′).
This inner product can be used in the formulation of many popular machine learning al-
gorithms without ever needing to project data into the new space. This is referred to as
the kernel trick. Thus, without needing to represent φ(x) or φ(x′) explicitly, we represent
similarities between φ(x) and φ(x′) [11].
The kernels considered in this thesis are outlined in Table 3.1.
Kernel PCA differs from linear PCA in that first a kernel function K(x, x′) is selected
(which maps to the inner product space of some feature space Z identified by a feature
map φ(x)). Rather than using data in the feature space (which may be infinitely large even
for finite data), instead, we construct a kernel matrix K whose entries, Ki,k, correspond
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linear poly
rbf cosine
Figure 3.1: Kernel comparison: each entry is a product represented by exploit types projected according
to four different kernels.
to K(xi, xk) ∀ xi, xk ∈ D ×D.
Then solving the eigenvector equation Nλα = Kα yields the principal components α and
eigenvalues λ in the kernel space [18]. In this chapter, we consider different kernels for
projecting categorical features into 2-dimensions for visualizing later clusterings. We will
use the cosine kernel for this purpose since it disperses examples more than the other
kernels.
3.3 K-Medoids
K-Medoids is a clustering problem in the same family as the K-means problem [27]. K-
Medoids aims to partition the data into K clusters, C = {C1, . . . , CK} with corresponding
cluster centers µi called medoids, chosen to minimize the total cost
K∑
i=1
∑
x∈Ci
d(x, µi),
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Figure 3.2: Variance ratio criterion: the ratio of within-cluster variance to between cluster variance for
our three distance measures
given some distance function d. Since medoids are defined according to a distance function,
we can use cosine dissimilarity since it corresponds to the kernel chosen in the last section.
The algorithm commonly used to approximate K-medoids is the partition around medoids
or PAM algorithm [27]. The algorithm starts by selecting K data points to be the initial
medoids. Similar to Lloyd’s algorithm for K-means, in the next step, points are assigned
to the closest medoid. Then the algorithm greedily selects swapping a medoid with a
non-medoid point in the dataset such that the overall cost is reduced. If no such point
exists, the algorithm is considered converged.
3.3.1 Selecting K and d
The distance function d : RF × RF → R characterizes how similar two data points are to
one another. Common distance functions (defined in Table 3.2) are the L2 metric (distance
between points in Cartesian space) and the L1 metric (the sum of the absolute differences
between points). Non-metric distance functions such as cosine dissimilarity (1 minus the
cosine of the angle between two vectors) can also be used.
We select both d and K according to the variance ratio criterion. This statistic measures
the ratio of within-cluster variance to between-cluster variance [2]. The first local maxi-
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Figure 3.3: A 3-medoids clustering of products according to their exploit types, Y CWEproduct with L1 distance.
Size is scaled relative to the number of CVE entries for each product and the top 10 products are darkened
and labelled.
Table 3.2: Common distance functions
Function name d(a, b)
L1 metric
∑N
i=1 |ai − bi|
L2 metric
∑N
i=1
√
(ai − bi)2
Cosine dissimilarity 1 -
∑N
i=1 ai, bi√∑N
i=1 a
2
i
√∑N
i=1 b
2
i
mum is used to select K and d. Here, for both clusterings K = 3 and d is the L1 metric.
The product by exploit type clustering variance ratio criterion is shown for varying values
of K and d in Figure 3.2.
3.3.2 Exploit type and products
Figure 3.3 shows a 3-medoids clustering of products according to the relative frequencies
of exploit types. In this clustering, some product lines are clustered and plotted close
together (e.g. Windows operating systems) and other very similar products are split
between clusters (Debian and Ubuntu for example). Overall, the data is not well separated.
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Figure 3.4: A 3-medoids clustering of products according to attack patterns, Y CAPECproduct with L1 distance.
Size is scaled relative to the number of CVE entries for each product and the top 10 products are darkened
and labelled.
Table 3.3: Common linkage criteria
Linkage criterion L(A,B, d)
Single linkage min
a∈A,b∈B
d(a, b)
Complete linkage max
a∈A,b∈B
d(a, b)
Average linkage 1
N
∑
a∈A,b∈B
d(a, b)
3.3.3 Attack patterns and products
Figure 3.4 shows products clustered according to the relative frequencies of attack patterns.
Unlike clustering products by exploit type, most large products are now grouped into a
single cluster. Products from the same vendor and products in the same product line are
mostly clustered together.
3.4 Hierarchical clustering
Hierarchical Clustering is a clustering method where data points are grouped into a cluster
hierarchy [14]. For the bottom-up (agglomerative) variant, initially each observation is
considered a singleton cluster. At each iteration, the two most similar clusters are merged
23
imagemagick
wireshark
reader
acrobat_dc
acrobat_reader_dc
seamonkey
chrome
fedora
firefox
thunderbird
debian_linux
enterprise_linux_desktop
enterprise_linux_server
enterprise_linux_workstation
leap
ubuntu_linux
firefox_esr
office
opensuse
itunes
iphone_os
mac_os_x
edge
internet_explorer
safari
acrobat_reader
acrobat
flash_player
tvos
watchos
android
windows_server_2012
windows_server_2016
windows_rt_8.1
windows_10
windows_8.1
windows_7
windows_server_2008
linux_kernel
windows_vista
(a)
imagemagick
reader
acrobat_dc
acrobat_reader_dc
debian_linux
enterprise_linux_desktop
enterprise_linux_server
enterprise_linux_workstation
leap
ubuntu_linux
fedora
chrome
firefox
thunderbird
firefox_esr
iphone_os
mac_os_x
office
opensuse
edge
itunes
internet_explorer
safari
acrobat_reader
tvos
watchos
acrobat
flash_player
seamonkey
wireshark
windows_7
windows_server_2008
windows_server_2012
windows_server_2016
windows_rt_8.1
windows_10
windows_8.1
android
linux_kernel
windows_vista
(b)
imagemagick
reader
acrobat_dc
acrobat_reader_dc
internet_explorer
safari
acrobat_reader
tvos
watchos
acrobat
flash_player
edge
itunes
firefox_esr
iphone_os
mac_os_x
office
opensuse
debian_linux
enterprise_linux_desktop
enterprise_linux_server
enterprise_linux_workstation
leap
ubuntu_linux
fedora
chrome
firefox
thunderbird
windows_7
windows_server_2008
windows_server_2012
windows_server_2016
windows_rt_8.1
windows_10
windows_8.1
android
linux_kernel
windows_vista
seamonkey
wireshark
(c)
Figure 3.5: Hierarchical clustering for the top 40 products according to exploit type, Y CWEproduct with cosine
dissimilarity for (a) complete, (b) single, and (c) average linkage.
until the desired number of clusters remain. The primary output of this process is a
dendrogram, a tree-representation of the successive cluster merge operations. Similar
entries occur next to one another and the height of each merge indicates the similarity
between the clusters being merged. A clustering is determined by a distance function and
a linkage criterion.
Distance functions, like in K-Medoids, measure the distance between two datapoints.
During the process, we also need to compute the distance between clusters. In order to
do that, we use a linkage criterion L to extend the notion of distance to clusters. Popular
choices, defined in Table 3.3, include single linkage, complete linkage, and average linkage.
In single linkage clustering, the similarity of two clusters is equivalent to the distance be-
tween the closest two points. In complete linkage clustering, similarity is instead equivalent
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Figure 3.6: Hierarchical clustering for the top 40 exploit types according to product Y productCWE with cosine
dissimilarity and average linkage
to the distance between the furthest two points.
3.4.1 Exploit type and products
Figure 3.5 compares the three linkage criteria in Table 3.3 for clustering products according
to the relative frequency of exploit types. Both single and average linkage group the top 40
products into three high-level groups. Windows operating systems along with Seamonkey
(an internet suite provided by Mozilla), Wireshark (a network protocol analyzer), the
Linux kernel, and Android form one group. In the second group, fall most of the web
browsers (IE, Firefox, Chrome, Safari, Edge) along with Linux distributions (OpenSUSE,
Debian, Ubuntu) and Apple’s operating systems. The third and smallest group contains
the document cloud versions of Adobe’s reader and Imagemagick.
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Figure 3.7: Hierarchical clustering for the (a) top 40 CAPECS Y productCAPEC according to product and (b)
top 40 products according to CAPECs Y CAPECproduct with cosine dissimilarity and average linkage
Figure 3.6 shows exploit types clustered according to product frequencies. Some similar
exploits (e.g. injection exploits, integer overflow/numeric errors) occur within close cluster
hierarchy whereas other seemingly unrelated attacks (cross-site request forgery and race
condition) also occur in close proximity.
3.4.2 Attack patterns and products
Figure 3.7 shows both CAPECs according to product frequencies and products clustered
according to CAPEC frequencies. The clustering of CAPECs has a clear series of low-cost
merges followed by a hierarchy of high cost merges. These low cost merges are accounted
for since CAPECs co-occur even more frequently than products. The product hierarchy is
similar to hierarchies by exploit type but there’s more separation between similar products
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and product types are also more split (web browsers, for example, are now divided between
all three clusters).
3.5 Method Comparison
Figure 3.8 shows how these methods cluster the top 40 products. Some products, for
example the Windows family and Android, are clustered together in all four clusterings.
Other product pairs, such as web browsers Chrome, Safari, and Internet Explorer, are
clustered together in three of the four clusterings. Hierarchical clustering by exploit type,
in particular, is dissimilar from the other methods in that one cluster is significantly smaller
than the other two, containing only 4 out of 40 datapoints.
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Figure 3.8: Cluster comparison: these are the assigned cluster labels (aligned for maximum matching)
between (a) K-medoids by exploit type, (b) K-medoids by attack pattern, (c) hierarchical clustering by
exploit type, and (d) hierarchical clustering by attack pattern.
4 Time series segmentation
Segmentation is a more specific form of the clustering problem considered in Chapter 3
[30]. Instead of grouping points in higher dimensional spaces, segmentation works to split
values indexed in a one-dimensional space into groups called segments. In time series
segmentation, the index is chronologically ordered.
Segmentation, the process of partitioning the data, is closely related to histograms, the
resulting data representation [13]. A histogram represents data by aggregating the entries
within each segment. This can be used to represent summary statistics on data streams
without needing to store all of the data in memory.
Another related concept is change point detection [1], where the breakpoints represent
changes in the underlying data or the process that generated it.
In this chapter, we outline these concepts and compare several algorithms for segment-
ing different features. Namely, we consider a dynamic programming algorithm that finds
optimal segmentations for a given additive cost function, an algorithm that identifies can-
didate change points in exponentially distributed data, and an approximation algorithm
that identifies candidate change points in multinomially distributed data.
Each algorithm corresponds with an experiment. The first experiment, segments the aver-
age severity by product using the dynamic programming solution. The second experiment
frames delay as an exponential process and identifies candidate change points in the delay
traces of specific products and versions. The third experiment models categorical features
as a multinomial process and identifies candidate change points where the distribution of
that feature changed. In this experiment, we consider exploit type and access complexity.
Together, these algorithms identify both individual points in time and patterns within
products where periods of major change happen. These periods might represent a shift in
attacker strategy or the life cycle of product and how vulnerabilities are identified as the
product ages. In either case, this information helps to conceptualize the development of
threats over the course of the history of the CVE list.
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4.1 Segmentation
Segmentation divides the index set I = 1 . . . N of a dataset D = {x1, x2, . . . , xN} into K
segments. These segments are a set of half-open intervals H = {[b1, b2), . . . , [bK , bK+1]}
that cover I and are disjoint, that is,
(
I =
⋃
hi∈H
hi
)
∧
(
∅ = hb ∩ ha, ∀ ha, hb ∈ H ×H : ha 6= hb
)
,
with breakpoints (boundaries) B = {b1 = 1, b2, . . . , bK , bK+1 = N}.
Change point detection is an alternate framing of the segmentation problem. A change
point is an abrupt change in the data stream.
Change point detection algorithms can be offline or online. Offline algorithms examine
the entire dataset at once, whereas online algorithms only require that data entries be
ephemerally stored in memory. Online algorithms are necessitated in situations where the
entire data set cannot be readily stored.
The change point detection method, Multinomial Change Detection Method [25], consid-
ered in this thesis is unsupervised and part of a larger family of change point detection
methods including CUSUM that consider a probability ratio. Other change detection
methods instead model the data generatively under a stochastic process including meth-
ods such as Bayesian Online CPD. Other kernelized similarity methods including kcpa
employ a kernel function to perform similarity based clustering. For a survey of change-
point detection methods, see Aminikhanghahi and Cook [1].
4.2 Cost function
Typically, segmentation algorithms optimize some additive cost function, c(a, b) where
a, b ∈ I and a < b. The cost of the segmentation c(H) can then be defined,
c(H) =
K∑
i=1
c(bi, bi+1).
The optimal solution is the set of breakpoints B that minimize c(H). For example, to
optimize the total mean squared error, we have the cost c(a, b) = ∑i∈[a,b)(xi − x¯)2, where
x¯ is the average of xa, . . . , xb−1.
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4.3 Dynamic programming solution
Identifying an optimal K-segmentation for D can be accomplished in O(N2K) time [13]
using dynamic programming if the cost can be precomputed for all subintervals in O(N2)
time. Let COST(i, k) be the minimum cost of segmenting the closed interval [1, i] into k
segments. Also let COST(i, 1) = c(1, i) ∀ i ∈ I. The recurrence that defines the algorithm
is
COST(i, k) = min
1≤j≤i
COST(j, k − 1) + c(j + 1, i).
The algorithm must iterate over all pairs of indicesK times in order to compute COST(N,K),
hence the O(N2K) overall time-complexity if the cost of a subinterval can be computed
in constant time [12].
4.4 Monotonic Segmentation
Consider now, a feature that can modeled under an exponential distribution F ∼ expon(λ)
with the probability density function:
f(x;λ) = λe−λx,
defined for all positive values of x. Our data can then be segmented using the negative log-
likelihood as the cost function, c (that is, we are maximizing the likelihood by minimizing
the negative log-likelihood) parameterized by the maximum likelihood estimate for the
scale parameter, λ = x¯−1 where x¯ is the average value in the segment. To segment this
feature, we find the K breakpoints that minimize the cost function,
K∑
i=1
L(Xi; 1
x¯
),
where L(x;λ) is the negative log-likelihood of the exponential distribution
L(x;λ) = −
N∑
i=1
log(f(x;λ))
and Xi are the values indexed by hi.
Monotonic segmentation is a variant of the segmentation problem where the average of
each bin in the segmentation changes monotonically. This restricted problem can be solved
by reducing the number of candidates only considering border indices [9, 29]. A border
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index is an index where the average values of all intervals ending at the index prior to
the border index are smaller than the average values of all intervals starting at the border
index. Since placing a boundary at other indices would violate the monotonic constraint,
the segmentation can be performed only considering border points.
Determining whether a given point is a border point can be done in O(|B|) time where B is
the set of border points identified thus far. For each new observation, affix the observation
to the end of the last bin. If the average of the bin now exceeds the average of the bin
that precedes it, merge the two bins. Continue merging until the condition holds.
The entire sequence can then be segmented using a modification of the algorithm in
Section 4.3 where only candidates are considered. This reduces the time complexity to
O(|B|2K). This method is well suited to unimodal data and allows for K-segmentation as
demonstrated by Haiminen and Gionis [9]. Though they consider a different cost function,
the same algorithm applies [29].
4.5 Multinomial Change Detection Method
Many of the features of CVE data entries are categorical. These categorical features
can be modelled by a multinomial distribution F ∼ Multi(p) where p is a vector of the
probabilities of the S labels in the label set L = {`1, . . . , `S}. The maximum likelihood
estimate for p, pˆi is simply the relative frequencies of the data that have appeared after i
observations,
pˆi =
〈∑i
j=1 I(xj = `k)
i
: `k ∈ L
〉
. (4.1)
Multinomial Change Detection Method (MCDM) is an online change point detection al-
gorithm that monitors the divergence between the static estimator pˆi and an adaptive
estimator p˜i over a data stream [25]. The adaptive estimator leverages the concept of tem-
porally aware likelihood. That is, past examples are weighted according to a forgetting
factor λi and an adaptive count ni that represents the count of the examples included in
the adaptive estimate. Because of this, the influence of a given example on the adaptive
estimator decreases as time elapses.
The adaptive estimator p˜i along with the adaptive count ni and the adaptive forgetting
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factor λi are updated after each observation according to the following updates:
p˜i =
(
1− 1
ni
)
p˜i−1 +
1
ni−1
OneHot(xi)
ni = λi−1ni−1 + 1
λi = λi−1 + η
(
OneHot(xi)
∇p˜i−1
p˜i−1
)
.
where OneHot(xi) is a one-hot encoding of the categorical observation xi,
OneHot(xi) = 〈1 if xi = `j otherwise, 0 ∀ `j ∈ L〉.
The selection of forgetting factors is explored by Bodenham and Adams [4]. The initial
forgetting factor λ0 is a ones-vector of length S and the initial adaptive estimate p˜0 is
a zeroes-vector of length S. The initial list of breakpoints B is empty and the adaptive
count n0 is initialized to a constant S length vector of  to avoid zero division. In our
implementation,  = η, a parameter given by the user.
These adaptive variables λi (and indirectly ni and p˜i) are updated using gradient ascent.
The gradients for p˜i and ni are also defined by a series of recursive updates:
∇p˜i =
(
1− 1
ni
)
∇p˜i−1 − ∇ni
n2i
(OneHot(xi)− p˜i−1)
∇ni = λi−1∇ni−1 + ni−1.
All gradients are initialized to zero vectors of length S.
Divergence between pˆ and p˜ is measured using KL-Divergence introduced by Kullback and
Leibler [15]. Let the KL-Divergence between pˆ and p˜ after observation i be known as κi
where
κi =
S∑
j=1
pˆ
(j)
i log
pˆ
(j)
i
p˜
(j)
i
;
here pˆ(j)i is the j-th component of pˆi. When κi exceeds the dynamic threshold i where
i = β
(
S max
j∈1...S
([
p˜
(j)
i√
pˆ
(j)
i
]2))
,
a breakpoint is added to B and the estimates are reset to their initializations. No new
breakpoints can be added to the list until a fixed grace period of G observations has passed.
Parameters G, η, and β can all be considered hyperparameters for the model. Parameters
G and β both tune how frequently change points are identified. When set too coarsely,
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change points can be missed (false negatives) and when set too finely, too many breakpoints
will be identified (false positives).
The learning rate, η, controls how quickly the adaptive estimates react to changes in the
data stream.
4.6 Segmenting severity aggregated by product
moodle ubuntu_linux windows_xp acrobat
5 6 7 8 9
Average severity score by product
Figure 4.1: Severity by product: each dot on the plot represents one of the top 100 most affected
products placed according to their average severity (cvss base score). Bin height represents the number
of products in each bin.
Severity, as outlined in Section 2.1.5, is a quantitative summary measure of an exploit’s
capability and impact. In this experiment, we consider the top 100 most affected products.
These products are each affected by over 200 CVE entries (Quicktime is the minimum with
201 associated CVEs).
Here we take the average severity score from all entries that affect a given product. The
resulting averages can be segmented (using the algorithm from Section 4.3) to separate
products into categories based on average severity.
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Figure 4.1 shows a 7-segmentation of the top 100 products optimized for minimum mean
squared error.
Products such as Moodle (4.86) and Ubuntu (5.62), along with about half of top products,
have an average severity score in the Medium (4.0–6.9) range, and coincidentally, fall in
the left most bin. Products such as Windows XP (7.65) and Adobe Acrobat (8.83) have
average severities in the High (7.0–8.9) range. Adobe Air is the only product in the top
100 with an average score in the Severe (9.0–10.0) range.
The products in the three rightmost bins have a high number of exploits that allow for
the remote execution of arbitrary code. For example, CVE-2014-0589 (with a cvss base
score of 10.0 is a heap overflow exploit on Adobe Air and Flash Player that allowed for
arbitrary code execution across a wide variety of operating system configurations. The
programs in this category are mostly designed for remote management and pdf readers.
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Figure 4.2: Delay over time: similar to trend in Figure 2.2, the delay in between entries has decreased
over time. Here, delay is represented by the average delay for all entries logged per quarter.
4.7 Segmenting delay signals by product
Delay is the time elapsed between two observations. In CVE data, this is the time between
a given CVE entry and the subsequent entry. Delay can be defined for all entries except
for the most recent (since no subsequent entry is defined). The delay signal taken over the
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Figure 4.3: Product delay: the segmentations for the product delay for Android (a) and Windows XP
(b). Below each histogram is a plot of the individual threats in time to visualize the distribution of
publication date.
entire dataset can be seen in Figure 4.2. This experiment also considers delay traces. Here
it is observed that delay can be modelled by an exponential distribution. More specifically,
delay is considered to exponentially grow or decay with time depending on the product.
A product can be represented a univariate data stream of delay values. Using first the
algorithm from Section 4.4 to reduce the number of candidate breakpoints and then the
algorithm from Section 4.3 to segment from among those candidates we can identify and
summarize periods in a products’ history where the pace of threats increased notably.
We will repeat this experiment for versions within a product to examine the effect of
version obsolescence on delay. Note, a single CVE entry may affect multiple versions of
the same product. In the intra-version experiments, entries with wildcard version CPE
strings will be removed from the data since it is unclear which versions they affect.
This experiment will consider Google’s Android and Microsoft’s Windows XP since they
both are affected by over 1,000 unique CVEs (see Figure 2.7) and represent the largest
product category, operating systems. Figure 4.3(a) shows a segmentation of Android delay
and Figure 4.3(b) shows a segmentation of Windows XP delay. Both products show the
exponential decay of delay over time and are thus good candidates for the Algorithm in
Section 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Version obsolescence: for version-specific CVEs, delay follows a similar pattern to the broader
delay trace. Each version experiences a decrease in delay throughout its supported lifetime followed by
few identified exploits after the product falls out of support.
However, its important to note that both Microsoft and Google (with an Android specific
team) are CVE Numbering Authorities [19]. Reports of new threats can be added directly
to the CVE list by the vendor in both cases. We also note that this trend is just as
attributable as a trend in threat reporting as it is in threat proliferation.
As demonstrated in Figure 4.4, which shows the Android delay traces segmented on a
version-by-version basis, threat reporting declines when a version or product becomes ob-
solete since the vendor is no longer providing security patches for that product. Successive
Android versions also have shorter delay in initial threat reporting, which may represent
a slower onset of threat proliferation or a faster identification and reporting of threats.
Overall, this experiment highlights the fact that the CVE list cannot be understood to
represent all computer security threats, and is better understood as a corpus of known
and researched threats since each threat has to undergo numbering, severity scoring, and
exploit classification. This means that the proliferation of threats (and its slowing trend
as seen in Figure 2.2) reflects both the threats themselves and the security infrastructure
that has been built to detect, chronicle, and publish threat information.
Either way, the number of known threats increases with time, and for many products
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Figure 4.5: Static label probability estimator: The maximum likelihood estimator for p, pˆ is the label’s
count divided by the total number of observations. Here, pˆ is shown for the top 10 exploit classes. Entries
with other exploit classes are excluded.
including both Windows XP and Android, more threats are identified as a given product
ages.
4.8 Change point detection for categorical features
CWE codes, CAPECs, and CVSS base metrics are all categorical features. These features
can be modelled as a multinomial process where each observation xi ∼ Multi(pi), where
pi are the true probabilities of each label at time i. In this experiment, MCDM will be
used to identify candidate points in time where the distribution of these features changed
rapidly. These points may indicate a shift in attack paradigms or capabilities.
For CWE codes only a subset of top S class labels will be used since the algorithm is
designed to work with smaller label sets. To handle excluded examples, we will consider
two options: removing them from the data set and grouping them under a single catch-all
label.
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For CWE codes, the static probability estimator pˆ (as defined in Equation 4.1) for the
representation with labels excluded is shown in Figure 4.5. This static probability trace
shows the shifting relative prominence of these labels over time. Unlike Figure 2.3 however,
it is a cumulative representation. Because of this, this trace is less noisy then the rolling
average shown in Chapter 1 even though it has higher (observation-level) granularity.
To avoid dividing by zero in the threshold comparison, the first j observations are con-
sidered a warm-up period. The index j is the first index such that all S labels have been
observed.
0 10k 20k 30k 40k 50k 60k
.1
1
η = 1e-08
η = 1e-10
η = 1e-12
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κᵢ
Figure 4.6: Learning rate: the learning rate η affects how quickly the KL divergence κi changes. Lower
learning rates result in less noisy traces. Too low of a learning rate will not be able to react to changes in
signal fast enough to record breakpoints.
4.8.1 Hyperparameter Tuning
For the third experiment, we must tune the three MCDM hyperparameters η, β, and G.
Following the recommendations in Plasse and Adams [25], η is set to 10−S where S is the
number of class labels in the distribution. Figure 4.6 shows how learning rates affect the
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Figure 4.7: β and G: the threshold bandwidth parameter β and the grace period length G both control
how coarse the segmentation should be. Too fine a segmentation identifies false breakpoints, too coarse a
segmentation neglects to identify true breakpoints. Here, η is fixed to 10−10.
Table 4.1: The MCDM hyperparameters for each dataset during change point detection
Dataset η β G
Top 10 CWEs (rest excluded) 10−10 .0216 700
Top 10 CWEs (rest together) 10−11 .0216 1008
Access Required 10−3 .0216 910
KL-divergence signal, κi. The higher learning rate results in a noisier trace which might
falsely flag breakpoints by reacting too quickly to changes in the data stream. One such
reaction can be seen at the 30k observation mark. The lower learning rate ceases to follow
the signal since it reacts too slowly to newer observations.
The other two hyperparameters directly influence the number of change points identified
and how many are false positives. More formally, Plasse and Adams [25] refers to the the
average run length or ARL0, the number of observations before the detector flags a false
positive.
The suggested value for β is outlined in Equation 4.2 where ARLd is the desired ARL.
β = 0.023− 0.001 log
(
N
ARLd
− 1
)
(4.2)
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For our experiments we will set our desired ARL to n/5 which yields a β of .022 for the
CWE experiment with S = 10 and other labels excluded. G which also affects the number
of false positives, will be set to ARLd/25+w where w is the length of the warm-up period.
This way, the ARL has a strict lower bound since no breakpoints will be identified for any
i < G. The hyperparameter values for each experiment are shown in Table 4.1
4.8.2 Results
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Figure 4.8: Top 10 CWEs: the segmented pˆ trace from the top 10 CWEs (other labels excluded) with
identified change points marked with vertical lines.
The multinomial change point detection experiments highlight periods where the compo-
sition of CVE entries changed rapidly. In Figure 4.8, we show trends among the top 10
overall CWE types. There are several periods of rapid change identified by MCDM. Two
periods of sustained change, one from 2008 to 2010 and another in 2014, are marked by
multiple repeatedly identified breakpoints.
The change in beginning in 2008 saw SQL injection go from representing 10% of all known
threats to representing 17.5% of all known threats over a year later. At the same time,
there was a more modest increase in cross-site scripting attacks and a decline in the
relative prominence of buffer overflow attacks. The end of this change period marked a
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Figure 4.9: CWE change points: the top 10 CWEs plus a catchall category.
rapid decrease in the identification of new SQL injection attacks (shown also in Figure 2.3).
Once other attack labels are considered, we see that the relative prominence of all 10 of
these known attacks are declining relative to other attacks. This change, identified by
the MCDM change point detection shown in Figure 4.9 is ongoing beginning sometime in
late 2016 or early 2017. During this diversification of threats, threats outside the 10 most
frequent CWEs increased from 14% of all known threats in 2015 to 32% of all threats
presently.
The four threats that are in the top 10 of all post-2017 CVEs that are not in the top 10 for
pre-2017 CVEs are: Out-of-bounds Read (CWE-125), Cross-site Request Forgery (CWE-
352), Use After Free (CWE-416), and Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190). These
threats, while not new, have increased markedly in prominence over the last 3 years.
Figure 4.10 shows MCDM change point detection for the Access Complexity severity score
base factor trends. This identifies a period between 2006 and 2008 as the rise of needed
access in order to exploit a system. Since then, the trend has levelled, where about half
of all threats require MEDIUM access and the other half require HIGH access.
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Figure 4.10: Access complexity: a slightly more granular version of the trace in Figure 2.5.
5 Further Work
There are numerous methods for approximating the problems in this thesis and some
methods may be better suited to our task domain than the methods chosen here. In
addition to method variety, we highlight here the data that are excluded from the analysis
in this thesis.
Clustering
PCA has a lower variance reconstruction error when more principal components are re-
tained. This does not necessarily imply that an efficient two dimensional representation
is impossible. Autoencoders, neural networks whose objective is to reproduce their input
after it has been compressed into a smaller space, could be used to train a data represen-
tation with a lower variance of reconstruction error. For example, modular autoencoders
(Reeve and Brown [26]), an ensemble-based autoencoder variant, or other autoencoders
built for feature extraction would be more performant than KernelPCA in the two dimen-
sional case.
Since CVE associated data (products, CAPECs, etc.) is many-to-many in nature, the
CVE list can also be represented as a weighted graph (see Figure 2.9) where CVE-IDs
that share associated data are connected. Alternate clustering methods, such as the Highly
Connected Subgraphs (HCS) clustering algorithm [10] or CLICK, a variant of HCS that
focuses on weighted graphs [28] could prove informative. Graph Laplacian matrix methods
(i.e. Graph Spectral Clustering) could also be applicable.
Natural language processing techniques including topic modelling could also provide in-
sight to how CVE entries relate to one another. In particular, automatic threat classi-
fication, as explored by Chen, Zhang, and Chen [5], could be helpful in expanding the
capacity of numbering authorities.
It would also be worthwhile to use clustering techniques to further study the relationship
between severity and products. Knowing which products are likely to incur severe threats
could help better distribute security resources.
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Segmentation
Regarding time series segmentation, it would be useful to segment other CVE features. In
particular, it would be interesting to apply the methods in this thesis to the relationship
between severity and time for particular products. As products age, do they require more
sophisticated attacks in order to overwhelm security countermeasures or are products late
in their support life cycle just as vulnerable as older products?
Regarding methods, other approaches to segmentation include approximation algorithms,
such as those summarized by Guha, Koudas, and Shim [8] which can be adapted to a
likelihood-based cost function. For monotone segmentation, isotonic regression methods
such as those implemented by Mair, Hornik, and Leeuw [17] can be used to identify
monotonic segmentations or for candidate reduction in the same way we considered border
points.
One of the broader problems in multinomial change point detection is working with larger
K. Methods such as the algorithm developed by Wang, Zou, Yin, et al. [31] are designed
to work within this constraint and would allow for the segmentation of CAPECs or even
a larger set of CWEs.
It would also be interesting to synthesize different feature trace signals into a unified change
detection method for the CVE overall. Methods designed to identify changes based on the
homogeneity of multivariate data (see, for example, [16]) could help detect changes across
the whole dataset.
6 Conclusion
In the 20 years since its inception, the CVE list and its associated infrastructure have been
able to improve communication between computer security professionals across a variety
of companies, jurisdictions, and use cases. Yet, as this shared infrastructure has grown,
so has the industry’s dependence on a small set of core products.
These core products each present unique security challenges, however, they occur in larger
families both by function and by the vendor responsible for development. Products within
these groups are affected by similar types of exploits. As demonstrated by hierarchical
clustering, these groups can be identified. Lessons in securing these products can then be
taken from similar products.
These products, operating systems and web browsers in particular, are ubiquitous in the
lives of billions of people across the world and therefore make uniquely attractive targets for
attackers to exploit. As our delay analysis shows, these products are likely to encounter an
increasing number of vulnerabilities and exposures throughout their supported life cycles
and the proliferation trend has continued steadily over the course of the CVE list’s history.
Similarly multinomial change detection shows that composition of these threats is also
changing and may even now be undergoing a paradigm shift. In particular, we identified
two periods of sustained change. The first, from 2008 to 2010 saw the rise of SQL injection
as the primary threat. Since 2010, SQL injection has been in a sustained relative decline.
Currently, however, threats outside of the all-time top 10 now exceed 30% of all threats.
Being able to understand these trends in threat development and the relationships and
correlations that underpin the co-occurrence of different exploit types is imperative to
both securing products and rapidly identifying new threats. As the CVE list continues to
grow, data mining tools such as the ones discussed in this thesis will prove increasingly
useful for analyzing, summarizing, and visualizing threat data.

Bibliography
[1] S. Aminikhanghahi and D. J. Cook. “A survey of methods for time series change
point detection”. In: Knowledge and information systems 51.2 (2017), pp. 339–367.
[2] J. Baarsch and M. E. Celebi. “Investigation of internal validity measures for K-
means clustering”. In: Proceedings of the international multiconference of engineers
and computer scientists. Vol. 1. sn. 2012, pp. 14–16.
[3] D. W. Baker, S. M. Christey, W. H. Hill, and D. E. Mann. “The Development of
a Common Enumeration of Vulnerabilities and Exposures”. In: Recent Advances in
Intrusion Detection. Vol. 7. 1999, p. 9.
[4] D. A. Bodenham and N. M. Adams. “Continuous monitoring for changepoints in
data streams using adaptive estimation”. In: Statistics and Computing 27.5 (2017),
pp. 1257–1270.
[5] Z. Chen, Y. Zhang, and Z. Chen. “A categorization framework for common computer
vulnerabilities and exposures”. In: The Computer Journal 53.5 (2010), pp. 551–580.
[6] FIRST. A Complete Guide to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System Version
2.0. https://www.first.org/cvss/v2/guide [Accessed: 2.4.2020]. 2007.
[7] FIRST. Common Vulnerability Scoring System version 3.1: Specification Document.
https://www.first.org/cvss/v3-1/cvss-v31-specification_r1.pdf [Ac-
cessed: 2.4.2020]. 2019.
[8] S. Guha, N. Koudas, and K. Shim. “Approximation and streaming algorithms for his-
togram construction problems”. In: ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
31.1 (2006), pp. 396–438.
[9] N. Haiminen and A. Gionis. “Unimodal segmentation of sequences”. In: Fourth IEEE
International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM’04). IEEE. 2004, pp. 106–113.
[10] E. Hartuv and R. Shamir. “A clustering algorithm based on graph connectivity”. In:
Information processing letters 76.4-6 (2000), pp. 175–181.
[11] T. Hofmann, B. Scho¨lkopf, and A. J. Smola. “Kernel methods in machine learning”.
In: The annals of statistics (2008), pp. 1171–1220.
48
[12] Y. E. Ioannidis and V. Poosala. “Balancing Histogram Optimality and Practicality
for Query Result Size Estimation”. In: SIGMOD Rec. 24.2 (May 1995), pp. 233–244.
issn: 0163-5808. doi: 10.1145/568271.223841. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/
568271.223841.
[13] H. V. Jagadish, N. Koudas, S. Muthukrishnan, V. Poosala, K. C. Sevcik, and T. Suel.
“Optimal Histograms with Quality Guarantees”. In: VLDB ’98 (1998), pp. 275–286.
[14] S. C. Johnson. “Hierarchical clustering schemes”. In: Psychometrika 32.3 (1967),
pp. 241–254.
[15] S. Kullback and R. A. Leibler. “On information and sufficiency”. In: The annals of
mathematical statistics 22.1 (1951), pp. 79–86.
[16] A. Lung-Yut-Fong, C. Le´vy-Leduc, and O. Cappe´. “Homogeneity and change-point
detection tests for multivariate data using rank statistics”. In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1107.1971
(2011).
[17] P. Mair, K. Hornik, and J. de Leeuw. “Isotone optimization in R: pool-adjacent-
violators algorithm (PAVA) and active set methods”. In: Journal of statistical soft-
ware 32.5 (2009), pp. 1–24.
[18] S. Mika, B. Scho¨lkopf, A. J. Smola, K.-R. Mu¨ller, M. Scholz, and G. Ra¨tsch. “Kernel
PCA and de-noising in feature spaces”. In: Advances in neural information processing
systems. 1999, pp. 536–542.
[19] MITRE. CVE - CNA Participants. https://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.
html [Accessed: 4.17.2020].
[20] MITRE. CVE - Terminology. https://cve.mitre.org/about/terminology.html
[Accessed: 4.3.2020]. 2017.
[21] MITRE. CVE ID Syntax Change (Archived). https://cve.mitre.org/cve/
identifiers/syntaxchange.html [Accessed: 4.3.2020]. 2018.
[22] MITRE. CVE-Compatible Products and Services (Archived). https://cve.mitre.
org/compatible/compatible.html [Accessed: 14.4.2020]. 2017.
[23] NIST. Common Platform Enumeration: Naming Specification Version 2.3. https:
//nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/IR/nistir7695.pdf [Accessed: 2.4.2020].
2011.
49
[24] npm. Auditing package dependencies for security vulnerabilities. https://docs.
npmjs.com/auditing-package-dependencies-for-security-vulnerabilities
[Accessed: 9.4.2020]. 2018.
[25] J. Plasse and N. M. Adams. “Multiple changepoint detection in categorical data
streams”. In: Statistics and Computing 29.5 (2019), pp. 1109–1125.
[26] H. Reeve and G. Brown. “Modular autoencoders for ensemble feature extraction”.
In: Feature Extraction: Modern Questions and Challenges. 2015, pp. 242–259.
[27] E. Schubert and P. J. Rousseeuw. “Faster k-Medoids Clustering: Improving the PAM,
CLARA, and CLARANS Algorithms”. In: CoRR abs/1810.05691 (2018). arXiv:
1810.05691. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/1810.05691.
[28] R. Sharan and R. Shamir. “CLICK: a clustering algorithm with applications to gene
expression analysis”. In: Proc Int Conf Intell Syst Mol Biol. Vol. 8. 307. 2000, p. 16.
[29] N. Tatti. “Fast likelihood-based change point detection”. In: ().
[30] E. Terzi and P. Tsaparas. “Efficient algorithms for sequence segmentation”. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 2006 SIAM International Conference on Data Mining. SIAM. 2006,
pp. 316–327.
[31] G. Wang, C. Zou, G. Yin, et al. “Change-point detection in multinomial data with a
large number of categories”. In: The Annals of Statistics 46.5 (2018), pp. 2020–2044.
[32] S. Wold, K. Esbensen, and P. Geladi. “Principal component analysis”. In: Chemo-
metrics and intelligent laboratory systems 2.1-3 (1987), pp. 37–52.

Appendix A CVSS Formula
The severity base score is defined as
BaseScore = round(((0.6× Impact) + (0.4× Exploitability)− 1.5)× f(Impact))
where Impact and Exploitability are
Impact = 10.41(1− (1− CImpact)(1− IImpact)(1−AImpact))
Exploitability = 20×AccessVector×AccessComplexity×Authentication.
The remaining terms are defined as follows
f(Impact) =
0 if Impact=0,1.176 otherwise
AccessVector =

requires local access : 0.395
adjacent network accessible : 0.646
network accessible : 1.0
AccessComplexity =

high : 0.35
medium : 0.61
low : 0.71
Authentication =

requires multiple instances of authentication : 0.45
requires single instance of authentication : 0.56
requires no authentication : 0.704
CImpact =

none : 0.0
partial : 0.275
complete : 0.660
IImpact =

none : 0.0
partial : 0.275
complete : 0.660
AImpact =

none : 0.0
partial : 0.275
complete : 0.660
